The Science Of Grammar
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«Гомельский государственный
университет
им. Ф. Скорины»
Филологический
факультет
THE SCIENCE OF GRAMMAR
Курсовая работа
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Студентка
группы К-42
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Т.Е.
Гомель 2006
Содержание
Introduction
1. Grammar bears to language
2. Grammar is the art of writing and
speaking correctly
3. The term grammar
4. The composition of language
Conclusion
Literature
"Haec de
Grammatica quam brevissime potui: non ut omnia dicerem sectatus, (quod
infinitum erat,) sed ut maxima necessaria."--QUINTILIAN. _De Inst. Orat._,
Lib. i, Cap. x.
Language, in the
proper sense of the term, is peculiar to man; so that, without a miraculous
assumption of human powers, none but human beings can make words the vehicle of
thought. An imitation of some of the articulate sounds employed in speech, may
be exhibited by parrots, and sometimes by domesticated ravens, and we know that
almost all brute animals have their peculiar natural voices, by which they
indicate their feelings, whether pleasing or painful. But language is an
attribute of reason, and differs essentially not only from all brute voices,
but even from all the chattering, jabbering, and babbling of our own species,
in which there is not an intelligible meaning, with division of thought, and
distinction of words.
Speech results
from the joint exercise of the best and noblest faculties of human nature, from
our rational understanding and our social affection; and is, in the proper use
of it, the peculiar ornament and distinction of man, whether we compare him
with other orders in the creation, or view him as an individual preeminent
among his fellows. Hence that science which makes known the nature and
structure of speech, and immediately concerns the correct and elegant use of
language, while it surpasses all the conceptions of the stupid or unlearned,
and presents nothing that can seem desirable to the sensual and grovelling, has
an intrinsic dignity which highly commends it to all persons of sense and taste,
and makes it most a favourite with the most gifted minds. That science is
Grammar. And though there be some geniuses who affect to despise the trammels
of grammar rules, to whom it must be conceded that many things which have been
unskillfully taught as such, deserve to be despised; yet it is true, as Dr.
Adam remarks, that, "The study of Grammar has been considered an object of
great importance by the wisest men in all ages."--_Preface to Latin and
English Gram._, p. iii.
Grammar bears to
language several different relations, and acquires from each a nature leading
to a different definition. First, It is to language, as knowledge is to
the thing known; and as doctrine, to the truths it inculcates. In these
relations, grammar is a science. It is the first of what have been called the
seven sciences, or liberal branches of knowledge; namely, grammar, logic,
rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Secondly, It is as
skill, to the thing to be done; and as power, to the instruments it employs. In
these relations, grammar is an art; and as such, has long been defined,
"_ars recte scribendi, recteque loquendi_" the art of writing and
speaking correctly. Thirdly, It is as navigation, to the ocean, which
nautic skill alone enables men to traverse. In this relation, theory and
practice combine, and grammar becomes, like navigation, a practical science. Fourthly,
It is as a chart, to a coast which we would visit. In this relation, our
grammar is a text-book, which we take as a guide, or use as a help to our own
observation. Fifthly, It is as a single voyage, to the open sea, the
highway of nations. Such is our meaning, when we speak of the grammar of a
particular text or passage.
Again: Grammar
is to language a sort of self-examination. It turns the faculty of speech or
writing upon itself for its own elucidation; and makes the tongue or the pen
explain the uses and abuses to which both are liable, as well as the nature and
excellency of that power, of which, these are the two grand instruments. From
this account, some may begin to think that in treating of grammar we are
dealing with something too various and changeable for the understanding to
grasp; a dodging Proteus of the imagination, who is ever ready to assume some
new shape, and elude the vigilance of the inquirer. But let the reader or
student do his part; and, if he please, follow us with attention. We will
endeavour, with welded links, to bind this Proteus, in such a manner that he
shall neither escape from our hold, nor fail to give to the consulter an
intelligible and satisfactory response. Be not discouraged, generous youth.
Hark to that sweet far-reaching note:
"Sed,
quanto ille magis formas se vertet in omnes, Tanto, nate, magis contende
tenacia vincla." VIRGIL.
Geor. IV, 411.
"But thou,
the more he varies forms, beware To strain his fetters with a stricter
care." DRYDEN'S VIRGIL.
If for a moment
we consider the good and the evil that are done in the world through the medium
of speech, we shall with one voice acknowledge, that not only the faculty
itself, but also the manner in which it is used, is of incalculable importance
to the welfare of man. But this reflection does not directly enhance our
respect for grammar, because it is not to language as the vehicle of moral or
of immoral sentiment, of good or of evil to mankind, that the attention of the
grammarian is particularly directed. A consideration of the subject in these
relations, pertains rather to the moral philosopher. Nor are the arts of logic
and rhetoric now considered to be properly within the grammarian's province.
Modern science assigns to these their separate places, and restricts grammar,
which at one period embraced all learning, to the knowledge of language, as
respects its fitness to be the vehicle of any particular thought or sentiment
which the speaker or writer may wish to convey by it. Accordingly grammar is
commonly defined, by writers upon the subject, in the special sense of an
art--"the art of speaking or writing a language with propriety or
correctness."--_Webster's Dict._
2.
Grammar is the art of writing and speaking correctly
Lily says,
"Grammatica est recte scribendi atque loquendi ars;" that is,
"Grammar is the art of writing and speaking correctly." Despauter,
too, in his definition, which is quoted in a preceding paragraph, not
improperly placed writing first, as being that with which grammar is primarily
concerned. For it ought to be remembered, that over any fugitive colloquial
dialect, which has never been fixed by visible signs, grammar has no control;
and that the speaking which the art or science of grammar teaches, is
exclusively that which has reference to a knowledge of letters. It is the
certain tendency of writing, to improve speech. And in proportion as books are
multiplied, and the knowledge of written language is diffused, local dialects,
which are beneath the dignity of grammar, will always be found to grow fewer,
and their differences less. There are, in the various parts of the world, many
languages to which the art of grammar has never yet been applied; and to which,
therefore, the definition or true idea of grammar, however general, does not
properly extend. And even where it has been applied, and is now honoured as a
popular branch of study, there is yet great room for improvement: barbarisms
and solecisms have not been rebuked away as they deserve to be.
Melancthon says,
"Grammatica est certa loquendi ac scribendi ratio, Latinis Latine."
Vossius, "Ars bene loquendi eoque et scribendi, atque id Latinis
Latine." Dr. Prat, "_Grammatica est recte loquendi atque scribendi
ars._" Ruddiman also, in his Institutes of Latin Grammar, reversed the
terms writing and speaking, and defined grammar, "_ars rece
loquendi scribendique_;" and, either from mere imitation, or from the
general observation that speech precedes writing, this arrangement of the words
has been followed by most modern grammarians. Dr. Lowth embraces both terms in
a more general one, and says, "Grammar is the art of rightly expressing
our thoughts by words." It is, however, the province of grammar, to
guide us not merely in the expression of our own thoughts, but also in our
apprehension of the thoughts, and our interpretation of the words, of others.
Hence, Perizonius, in commenting upon Sanctius's imperfect definition,
"_Grammatica est ars recte loquendi_," not improperly asks, "_et
quidni intelligendi et explicandi_?" "and why not also of
understanding and explaining?" Hence, too, the art of reading is
virtually a part of grammar; for it is but the art of understanding and
speaking correctly that which we have before us on paper. And Nugent has
accordingly given us the following definition: "Grammar is the art of
reading, speaking, and writing a language by rules."--_Introduction to
Dict._, p. xii.[1]
The word
_recte_, rightly, truly, correctly, which occurs in most of the foregoing Latin
definitions, is censured by the learned Richard Johnson, in his Grammatical
Commentaries, on account of the vagueness of its meaning. He says, it is not
only ambiguous by reason of its different uses in the Latin classics, but
destitute of any signification proper to grammar. But even if this be true as
regards its earlier application, it may well be questioned, whether by
frequency of use it has not acquired a signification which makes it proper at
the present time. The English word correctly seems to be less liable to
such an objection; and either this brief term, or some other of like import,
(as, "with correctness"--"with propriety,") is still
usually employed to tell what grammar is. But can a boy learn by such means
what it is, _to speak and write grammatically_? In one sense, he can; and in an
other, he cannot. He may derive, from any of these terms, some idea of grammar
as distinguished from other arts; but no simple definition of this, or of any
other art, can communicate to him that learns it, the skill of an artist.
R. Johnson
speaks at large of the relation of words to each other in sentences, as
constituting in his view the most essential part of grammar; and as being a
point very much overlooked, or very badly explained, by grammarians in general.
His censure is just. And it seems to be as applicable to nearly all the
grammars now in use, as to those which he criticised a hundred and thirty years
ago. But perhaps he gives to the relation of words, (which is merely their
dependence on other words according to the sense,) an earlier introduction and
a more prominent place, than it ought to have in a general system of grammar.
To the right use of language, he makes four things to be necessary. In citing
these, I vary the language, but not the substance or the order of his
positions. First, That we should speak and write words according to the
significations which belong to them: the teaching of which now pertains to
lexicography, and not to grammar, except incidentally. " Secondly, That
we should observe the relations that words have one to another in
sentences, and represent those relations by such variations, and particles, as
are usual with authors in that language." Thirdly, That we should
acquire a knowledge of the proper sounds of the letters, and pay a due regard
to accent in pronunciation. Fourthly, That we should learn to write
words with their proper letters, spelling them as literary men generally do.
From these positions,
(though he sets aside the first, as pertaining to lexicography, and not now
togrammar, as it formerly did,) the learned critic deduces first his four parts
of the subject, and then his definition of grammar. "Hence," says he,
"there arise Four Parts of Grammar; Analogy, which treats of the
several parts of speech, their definitions, accidents, and formations; Syntax,
which treats of the use of those things in construction, according to their
relations; Orthography, which treats of spelling; and Prosody, which
treats of accenting in pronunciation. So, then, the true definition of Grammar
is this: Grammar is the art of expressing the relations of things in
construction, with due accent in speaking, and orthography in writing,according
to the custom of those whose language we learn." Again he adds: "The
word relation has other senses, taken by itself; but yet the relation
of words one to another in a sentence, has no other signification
than what I intend by it, namely, of cause, effect, means, end, manner,
instrument, object, adjunct, and the like; which are names given by logicians
to those relations under which the mind comprehends things, and therefore the
most proper words to explain them to others. And if such things are too hard
for children, then grammar is too hard; for there neither is, nor can be, any
grammar without them. And a little experience will satisfy any man, that the
young will as easily apprehend them, as _gender, number, declension_, and other
grammar-terms." See _R. Johnson's Grammatical Commentaries_, p. 4.
It is true, that
the _relation of words_--by which I mean that connexion between them, which the
train of thought forms and suggests--or that dependence which one word has on
an other according to the sense--lies at the foundation of all syntax. No rule or
principle of construction can ever have any applicability beyond the limits, or
contrary to the order, of this relation. To see what it is in any given case,
is but to understand the meaning of the phrase or sentence. And it is plain,
that no word ever necessarily agrees with an other, with which it is not thus
connected in the mind of him who uses it. No word ever governs an other, to
which the sense does not direct it. No word is ever required to stand
immediately before or after an other, to which it has not some relation
according to the meaning of the passage.
Here then are
the relation, agreement, government, and arrangement, of words in sentences;
and these make up the whole of syntax--but not the whole of grammar. To this
one part of grammar, therefore, the relation of words is central and
fundamental; and in the other parts also, there are some things to which the
consideration of it is incidental; but there are many more, like spelling,
pronunciation, derivation, and whatsoever belongs merely to letters, syllables,
and the forms of words, with which it has, in fact, no connexion. The relation
of words, therefore, should be clearly and fully explained in its proper place,
under the head of syntax; but the general idea of grammar will not be brought nearer
to truth, by making it to be "the art of expressing the relations of
things in construction," &c., according to the foregoing definition.
The term grammar
is derived from the Greek word [Greek: gramma], a letter. The art or
science to which this term is applied, had its origin, not in cursory speech,
but in the practice of writing; and speech, which is first in the order of
nature, is last with reference to grammar. The matter or common subject of grammar,
is language in general; which, being of two kinds, spoken and written,
consists of certain combinations either of sounds or of visible signs,
employed for the expression of thought. Letters and sounds, though often
heedlessly confounded in the definitions given of vowels, consonants, &c.,
are, in their own nature, very different things. They address themselves to
different senses; the former, to the sight; the latter, to the hearing. Yet, by
a peculiar relation arbitrarily established between them, and in consequence of
an almost endless variety in the combinations of either, they coincide in a
most admirable manner, to effect the great object for which language was
bestowed or invented; namely, to furnish a sure medium for the communication of
thought, and the preservation of knowledge.
All languages,
however different, have many things in common. There are points of a
philosophical character, which result alike from the analysis of any language,
and are founded on the very nature of human thought, and that of the sounds or
other signs which are used to express it. When such principles alone are taken
as the subject of inquiry, and are treated, as they sometimes have been,
without regard to any of the idioms of particular languages, they constitute
what is called General, Philosophical, or Universal Grammar. But to teach, with
Lindley Murray and some others, that "Grammar may be considered as consisting
of two species, Universal and Particular," and that the latter merely
"applies those general principles to a particular language," is to
adopt a twofold absurdity at the outset.[2] For every cultivated language has
its particular grammar, in which whatsoever is universal, is necessarily
included; but of which, universal or general principles form only a part, and
that comparatively small. We find therefore in grammar no "two
species" of the same genus; nor is the science or art, as commonly defined
and understood, susceptible of division into any proper and distinct sorts,
except with reference to different languages--as when we speak of Greek, Latin,
French, or English grammar.
There is,
however, as I have suggested, a certain science or philosophy of language,
which has been denominated Universal Grammar; being made up of those points
only, in which many or all of the different languages preserved in books, are
found to coincide. All speculative minds are fond of generalization; and, in
the vastness of the views which may thus be taken of grammar, such may find an
entertainment which theynever felt in merely learning to speak and write
grammatically. But the pleasure of such contemplations is not the earliest or
the most important fruit of the study. The first thing is, to know and
understand the grammatical construction of our own language. Many may profit by
this acquisition, who extend not their inquiries to the analogies or the idioms
of other tongues. It is true, that every item of grammatical doctrine is the
more worthy to be known and regarded, in proportion as it approaches to
universality. But the principles of all practical grammar, whether universal or
particular, common or peculiar, must first be learned in their application to
some one language, before they can be distinguished into such classes; and it is
manifest, both from reason and from experience, that the youth of any nation
not destitute of a good book for the purpose, may best acquire a knowledge of
those principles, from the grammatical study of their native tongue.
Universal or
Philosophical Grammar is a large field for speculation and inquiry, and
embraces many things which, though true enough in themselves, are unfit to be
incorporated with any system of practical grammar, however comprehensive its
plan. Many authors have erred here. With what is merely theoretical, such a
system should have little to do. Philosophy, dealing in generalities, resolves
speech not only as a whole into its constituent parts and separable elements,
as anatomy shows the use and adaptation of the parts and joints of the human
body; but also as a composite into its matter and form, as one may contemplate
that same body in its entireness, yet as consisting of materials, some solid
and some fluid, and these curiously modelled to a particular figure. Grammar,
properly so called, requires only the former of these analyses; and in
conducting the same, it descends to the thousand minute particulars which are
necessary to be known in practice. Nor are such things to be despised as
trivial and low: ignorance of what is common and elementary, is but the more
disgraceful for being ignorance of mere rudiments. "Wherefore," says
Quintilian, "they are little to be respected, who represent this art as
mean and barren; in which, unless you faithfully lay the foundation for the
future orator, whatever superstructure you raise will tumble into ruins. It is
an art, necessary to the young, pleasant to the old, the sweet companion of the
retired, and one which in reference to every kind of study has in itself more
of utility than of show. Let no one therefore despise as inconsiderable the
elements of grammar. Not because it is a great thing, to distinguish consonants
from vowels, and afterwards divide them into semivowels and mutes; but because,
to those who enter the interior parts of this temple of science, there will
appear in many things a great subtilty, which is fit not only to sharpen the
wits of youth, but also to exercise the loftiest erudition and
science."--De Institutione Oratoria, Lib. i, Cap. iv.
It was the
"original design" of grammar, says Dr. Adam, to facilitate "the
acquisition of languages;" and, of all practical treatises on the subject,
this is still the main purpose. In those books which are to prepare the learner
to translate from one tongue into another, seldom is any thing else attempted.
In those also which profess to explain the right use of vernacular speech, must
the same purpose be ever paramount, and the "original design" be kept
in view. But the grammarian may teach many things incidentally. One cannot
learn a language, without learning at the same time a great many opinions,
facts, and principles, of some kind or other, which are necessarily embodied in
it. For all language proceeds from, and is addressed to, the understanding; and
he that perceives not the meaning of what he reads, makes no acquisition even
of the language itself. To the science of grammar, the nature of the ideas conveyed
by casual examples, is not very essential: to the learner, it is highly
important. The best thoughts in the best diction should furnish the models for
youthful study and imitation; because such language is not only the most worthy
to be remembered, but the most easy to be understood. A distinction is also to
be made between use and abuse. In nonsense, absurdity, or falsehood, there can
never be any grammatical authority; because, however language may be abused,
the usage which gives law to speech, is still that usage which is founded upon
the common sense of mankind.
Grammar appeals
to reason, as well as to authority, but to what extent it should do so, has
been matter of dispute. "The knowledge of useful arts," says
Sanctius, "is not an invention of human ingenuity, but an emanation from
the Deity, descending from above for the use of man, as Minerva sprung from the
brain of Jupiter. Wherefore, unless thou give thyself wholly to laborious
research into the nature of things, and diligently examine the causes and
reasons of the art thou teachest, believe me, thou shalt but see with other
men's eyes, and hear with other men's ears. But the minds of many are
preoccupied with a certain perverse opinion, or rather ignorant conceit, that
in grammar, or the art of speaking, there are no causes, and that reason is
scarcely to be appealed to for any thing;--than which idle notion, I know of
nothing more foolish;--nothing can be thought of which is more offensive. Shall
man, endowed with reason, do, say, or contrive any thing, without design, and
without understanding? Hear the philosophers; who positively declare that
nothing comes to pass without a cause. Hear Plato himself; who affirms that
names and words subsist by nature, and contends that language is derived from
nature, and not from art."
"I
know," says he, "that the Aristotelians think otherwise; but no one
will doubt that names are the signs, and as it were the instruments, of things.
But the instrument of any art is so adapted to that art, that for any other
purpose it must seem unfit; thus with an auger we bore, and with a saw we cut
wood; but we split stones with wedges, and wedges are driven with heavy mauls.
We cannot therefore but believe that those who first gave names to things, did
it with design; and this, I imagine, Aristotle himself understood when he said,
_ad placitum nomina significare._ For those who contend that names were made by
chance, are no less audacious than if they would endeavour to persuade us, that
the whole order of the universe was framed together fortuitously."
"You will
see," continues he, "that in the first language, whatever it was, the
names of things were taken from Nature herself; but, though I cannot affirm
this to have been the case in other tongues, yet I can easily persuade myself
that in every tongue a reason can be rendered for the application of every
name; and that this reason, though it is in many cases obscure, is nevertheless
worthy of investigation. Many things which were not known to the earlier
philosophers, were brought to light by Plato; after the death of Plato, many
were discovered by Aristotle; and Aristotle was ignorant of many which are now
everywhere known. For truth lies hid, but nothing is more precious than truth.
But you will say, 'How can there be any certain origin to names, when one and
the same thing is called by different names, in the several parts of the
world?' I answer, of the same thing there may be different causes, of which
some people may regard one, and others, an other. * * * There is therefore no
doubt, that of all things, even of words, a reason is to be rendered: and if we
know not what that reason is, when we are asked; we ought rather to confess
that we do not know, than to affirm that none can be given. I know that
Scaliger thinks otherwise; but this is the true account of the matter."
"These
several observations," he remarks further, "I have unwillingly
brought together against those stubborn critics who, while they explode reason
from grammar, insist so much on the testimonies of the learned. But have they
never read Quintilian, who says, (Lib. i, Cap. 6,) that, 'Language is
established by reason, antiquity, authority, and custom?' He therefore does not
exclude reason, but makes it the principal thing. Nay, in a manner, Laurentius,
and other grammatists, even of their fooleries, are forward to offer reasons,
such as they are. Moreover, use does not take place without reason;
otherwise, it ought to be called abuse, and not use. But from use authority
derives all its force; for when it recedes from use, authority becomes nothing:
whence Cicero reproves Coelius and Marcus Antonius for speaking according to
their own
fancy, and not according to use.
But, 'Nothing can be lasting,' says Curtius, (Lib. iv,) 'which is not based
upon reason.' It remains, therefore, that of all things the reason be first
assigned; and then, if it can be done, we may bring forward testimonies; that
the thing, having every advantage, may be made the more clear."--Sanctii Minerva,
Lib. i, Cap. 2.
ulius Caesar
Scaliger, from whose opinion Sanctius dissents above, seems to limit the
science of grammar to bounds considerably too narrow, though he found within them
room for the exercise of much ingenuity and learning. He says, "Grammatica
est scientia loquendi ex usu; neque enim constituit regulas scientibus usus
modum, sed ex eorum statis frequentibusque usurpatiombus colligit communem
rationem loquendi, quam discentibus traderet."--_De Causis L. Latinae_,
Lib. iv, Cap. 76. "Grammar is the science of speaking according to use;
for it does not establish rules for those who know the manner of use, but from
the settled and frequent usages of these, gathers the common fashion of
speaking, which it should deliver to learners." This limited view seems
not only to exclude from the science the use of the pen, but to exempt the
learned from any obligation to respect the rules prescribed for the initiation
of the young. But I have said, and with abundant authority, that the
acquisition of a good style of writing is the main purpose of the study; and,
surely, the proficients and adepts in the art can desire for themselves no such
exemption. Men of genius, indeed, sometimes affect to despise the pettiness of
all grammatical instructions; but this can be nothing else than affectation,
since the usage of the learned is confessedly the basis of all such
instructions, and several of the loftiest of their own rank appear on the list
of grammarians.
Quintilian,
whose authority is appealed to above, belonged to that age in which the
exegesis of histories, poems, and other writings, was considered an essential
part of grammar. He therefore, as well as Diomedes, and other ancient writers,
divided the grammarian's duties into two parts; the one including what is now
called grammar, and the other the explanation of authors, and the stigmatizing
of the unworthy. Of the opinion referred to by Sanctius, it seems proper to
make here an ampler citation. It shall be attempted in English, though the
paragraph is not an easy one to translate. I understand the author to say,
"Speakers, too, have their rules to observe; and writers, theirs. Language
is established by reason, antiquity, authority, and custom. Of reason the chief
ground is analogy, but sometimes etymology. Ancient things have a certain
majesty, and, as I might say, religion, to commend them. Authority is wont to
be sought from orators and historians; the necessity of metre mostly excuses
the poets. When the judgement of the chief masters of eloquence passes for
reason, even error seems right to those who follow great leaders. But, of the
art of speaking, custom is the surest mistress; for speech is evidently to be
used as money, which has upon it a public stamp. Yet all these things require a
penetrating judgement, especially analogy; the force of which is, that one may
refer what is doubtful, to something similar that is clearly established, and
thus prove uncertain things by those which are sure."--QUINT, _de Inst.
Orat._, Lib. i, Cap. 6, p. 48.
He science of
grammar, whatever we may suppose to be its just limits, does not appear to have
been better cultivated in proportion as its scope was narrowed. Nor has its
application to our tongue, in particular, ever been made in such a manner, as
to do great honour to the learning or the talents of him that attempted
it. What is new to a nation, may be old to the world. The development of the
intellectual powers of youth by instruction in the classics, as well as the
improvement of their taste by the exhibition of what is elegant in literature,
is continually engaging the attention of new masters, some of whom may seem to
effect great improvements; but we must remember that the concern itself is of
no recent origin. Plato and Aristotle, who were great masters both of grammar
and of philosophy, taught these things ably at Athens, in the fourth century before
Christ. Varro, the grammarian, usually styled the most learned of the
Romans, was contemporary with the Saviour and his apostles. Quintilian
lived in the first century of our era, and before he wrote his most
celebrated book, taught a school twenty years in Rome, and received from the
state a salary which made him rich. This "consummate guide of wayward
youth," as the poet Martial called him, being neither ignorant of what had
been done by others, nor disposed to think it a light task to prescribe the
right use of his own language, was at first slow to undertake the work upon
which his fame now reposes; and, after it was begun, diligent to execute it
worthily, that it might turn both to his own honour, and to the real
advancement of learning.He says, at the commencement of his book: "After I
had obtained a quiet release from those labours which for twenty years had
devolved upon me as an instructor of youth, certain persons familiarly demanded
of me, that I should compose something concerning the proper manner of
speaking; but for a long time I withstood their solicitations, because I knew
there were already illustrious authors in each language, by whom many things
which might pertain to such a work, had been very diligently written, and left
to posterity. But the reason which I thought would obtain for me an easier
excuse, did but excite more earnest entreaty; because, amidst the various
opinions of earlier writers, some of whom were not even consistent with
themselves, the choice had become difficult; so that my friends seemed to have
a right to enjoin upon me, if not the labour of producing new instructions, at
least that of judging concerning the old. But although I was persuaded not so
much by the hope of supplying what was required, as by the shame of refusing,
yet, as the matter opened itself before me, I undertook of my own accord a much
greater task than had been imposed; that while I should thus oblige my very
good friends by a fuller compliance, I might not enter a common path and tread
only in the footsteps of others. For most other writers who have treated of the
art of speaking, have proceeded in such a manner as if upon adepts in every
other kind of doctrine they would lay the last touch in eloquence; either
despising as little things the studies which we first learn, or thinking them
not to fall to their share in the division which should be made of the
professions; or, what indeed is next to this, hoping no praise or thanks for
their ingenuity about things which, although necessary, lie far from
ostentation: the tops of buildings make a show, their foundations are
unseen."--_Quintiliani de Inst. Orat., Prooemium._
But the reader
may ask, "What have all these things to do with English Grammar?" I
answer, they help to show us whence and what it is. Some acquaintance with the
history of grammar as a science, as well as some knowledge of the structure of
other languages than our own, is necessary to him who professes to write for
the advancement of this branch of learning--and for him also who would be a
competent judge of what is thus professed. Grammar must not forget her origin.
Criticism must not resign the protection of letters. The national literature of
a country is in the keeping, not of the people at large, but of authors and
teachers. But a grammarian presumes to be a judge of authorship, and a teacher
of teachers; and is it to the honour of England or America, that in both
countries so many are countenanced in this assumption of place, who can read no
language but their mother tongue? English Grammar is not properly an indigenous
production, either of this country or of Britain; because it is but a branch of
the general science of philology-- a new variety, or species, sprung up from
the old stock long ago transplanted from the soil of Greece and Rome.
It is true,
indeed, that neither any ancient system of grammatical instruction nor any
grammar of an other language, however contrived, can be entirely applicable to
the present state of our tongue; for languages must needs differ greatly one
from an other, and even that which is called the same, may come in time to
differ greatly from what it once was. But the general analogies of speech,
which are the central principles of grammar, are but imperfectly seen by the
man of one language. On the other hand, it is possible to know much of those
general principles, and yet be very deficient in what is peculiar to our own
tongue. Real improvement in the grammar of our language, must result from a
view that is neither partial nor superficial. "Time, sorry artist,"
as was said of old, "makes all he handles worse." And Lord Bacon,
seeming to have this adage in view, suggests: "If Time of course alter all
things to the worse, and Wisdom and Counsel shall not alter them to the better,
what shall be the end?"--_Bacon's Essays_, p. 64.
Conclusion
Hence the need
that an able and discreet grammarian should now and then appear, who with
skillful hand can effect those corrections which a change of fashion or the
ignorance of authors may have made necessary; but if he is properly qualified
for his task, he will do all this without a departure from any of the great
principles of Universal Grammar. He will surely be very far from thinking, with
a certain modern author, whom I shall notice in an other chapter, that,
"He is bound to take words and explain them as he finds them in his day, without
any regard to their ancient construction and application."--_Kirkham's
Gram._, p. 28. The whole history of every word, so far as he can ascertain it,
will be the view under which he will judge of what is right or wrong in the
language which he teaches. Etymology is neither the whole of this view, nor yet
to be excluded from it. I concur not therefore with Dr. Campbell, who, to make
out a strong case, extravagantly says, "It is never from an attention
to etymology, which would frequently mislead us, but from custom, the
only infallible guide in this
matter, that the meanings of words in present use must be
learnt."--Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 188. Jamieson too, with an
implicitness little to be commended, takes this passage from Campbell; and,
with no other change than that of "_learnt_" to "_learned_"
publishes it as a corollary of his own.--Grammar of Rhetoric, p. 42. It
is folly to state for truth what is so obviously wrong. Etymology and custom
are seldom at odds; and where they are so, the latter can hardly be deemed
infallible.
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